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We Need to Talk About Timber 
Angus Law and Rory Hadden 
School of Engineering, The University of Edinburgh 
1. Introduction 
The construction industry is characterised by ignorance, indifference, and lack of clarity on 
roles and responsibilities [1]. There is a culture across the sector which can be described as 
a ‘race to the bottom’ [1]. There is insufficient focus on delivering the best quality building 
possible [1]. This, in May 2018, is how Dame Judith Hackitt described the UK construction 
industry – with her specific focus on buildings. Her interim report Building a Safer Future, 
was intended as ‘a call to action for an entire industry’ [2] – recognising that ‘true and 
lasting change will require a universal shift in culture’ [2]. 
 
The Westminster government’s immediate response to Hackitt was to ‘ban’ combustible 
materials for use in the external wall of residential buildings with a height greater than 18 m 
[3]. The government’s impact study in support of the ‘ban’ explicitly identified that the 
engineered timber industry would see significantly reduced growth due to post-Grenfell 
regulatory changes [4]. Has the use of a material that has been increasingly of interest to 
the tall building industry [5] suddenly been ‘scuppered’ [6]? Why was mass timber not 
included within the government’s list of exemptions? It would surely have been easy to draft 
some text to exempt timber from the ban. 
 
The proponents of tall timber have spent the best part of a decade talking down the 
combustible nature of timber. We are told that there is ‘a common misconception about 
timber is that it is more susceptible to fire [than other materials]’ [7]; that ‘it’s a very hard 
material to light’ [8]; that it exhibits ‘charring rather than going up in flame’ [7]; and that ‘it 
burns in a very predictable fashion’ [9]. While there is some truth in these statements – the 
authors could make counter arguments: wood can be ‘ignited relatively easily’ [10]; 
‘mechanically, timber performs worse than steel or concrete at high temperature’ [11]–[13]; 
in some cases exposed surfaces do ‘not extinguish’ [14]. In each case, the performance of 
timber construction depends entirely on the context.  
 
It could perhaps be argued that simplistic messaging was necessary to overcome 
misconceptions, and to open the minds of non-specialists to the possibilities of mass timber 
construction in an industry which has been historically predisposed towards non-
combustible forms of construction. A case in point is Bridport House, where a Registered 
Architect explained that ‘we challenged [the residents] to set a big piece [of CLT] on fire. 
Which they duly tried and didn’t succeed. From that point on [CLT] was accepted as the 
best way to make the main part of the building’ [15]. For the same project, a contractor’s 
site manager was quoted as saying ‘cross-laminated timber is a massive timber material 
that does not bear extra risk in the case of fire. The outer parts would char, protecting the 
bulk of the material and bringing no danger of structural collapse’ [16]. It could perhaps be 
assumed that behind the simplistic messaging, designers were – in fact – systematically 
identifying and addressing the new hazards. 
 
If any further reminder could be needed about the importance of selecting appropriate 
construction materials, and adequately considering the hazards these materials present – 
Bridport House also serves as an unfortunate case study. It has recently been reported that 
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the building must be ‘emptied’ [17] due the fire safety risks associated to the presence of 
combustible cladding. It was reported that the building’s owner (Hackney Council) say that 
‘no tests were carried out to see if the insulation could be compliant with the cross-
laminated timber frame and type of brickwork used at the block’ [17]. Given this context, it is 
easy to imagine why the ‘government doesn’t trust industry’ [18] and chose not to include 
mass timber within the list of exemptions to the ‘ban’. 
 
While visionary designers articulately and persuasively set-out why timber represents the 
future of the construction industry [19], [20] – it is our experience and observation based on 
multiple completed and proposed projects (and ongoing dialogue with designers, approval 
authorities, and enforcement agencies) that there is, and has been, a systematic failure to 
explicitly identify and address the hazards introduced by the use of engineered timber.  
 
We have not been able to distinguish whether this failure is routed in ignorance, 
indifference, lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities, or is simply a symptom of 
Hackitt’s ‘race to the bottom’. Nevertheless, this paper, and the accompanying talk at the 
Institution of Structural Engineers [21] are an attempt to clearly articulate some of the key 
hazards associated with engineered timber – and show how these may be addressed by 
competent design professionals. 
2. Common Building Situations 
The current tallest timber building in the world stands at 18 storeys [22] and the ‘world’s 
largest CLT building’ [23], Dalston Lane, is in the UK. These records are, however, unlikely 
to stand unchallenged for more than a year or two. Such structures are, by definition, 
ground-breaking – the first of their kind. As noted by Foster [24], ‘definitions of “tallness” are 
subjective and dependent on context’ – for fire safety we would suggest that tall timber 
buildings are those buildings where the fire strategy includes phased vertical evacuation, a 
stay put strategy, or where internal fire-fighting is required. 
 
As designers push boundaries, it becomes increasingly important to explicitly check that the 
underlying assumptions of the engineering methods used remain valid. In England, the 
most common engineering tool that is applied to the fire safety design of buildings is the 
guidance of Approved Document B (ADB) [25]. This document is not a conventional design 
tool, in the way that a structural engineer might think about a finite element model or a 
structural Eurocode. Rather, Approved Document B provides a series of solutions that, if 
applied carefully and only where applicable, can allow the designer to meet the functional 
requirements of the Building Regulations. However, in precisely the same way as for any 
other engineering tool, the designer must carefully check that the assumptions that 
underpin the guidance of ADB (i.e. the design tool) remain appropriate for the given 
situation. 
 
This idea is explicitly captured on the first page of ADB; the scope of application is limited in 
that the Approved Documents are intended to ‘cover common building situations’. Where a 
building is the tallest or the biggest – it ceases, by definition, to be a common building 
situation. Such boasts draw explicit attention to the unusual nature of the buildings; 
wherever superlatives are applied in engineering, history has taught us to take particular 
care. Being the biggest would have brought little comfort to the passengers of the Titanic. 
However, it is not the superlatives themselves that require caution to be applied; rather, 
whether or not a step change that has occurred that means our previous insights and 
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understanding no longer apply. It is therefore important that designers closely examine the 
assumptions that underpin the fire safety solutions presented in the guidance, to ensure 
they are applicable – and identify where they are not. 
 
The 2019 version of Approved Document B is explicit that ‘those with responsibility for 
meeting the requirements of the regulations will need to consider for themselves whether 
following the guidance in the approved documents is likely to meet those requirements in 
the particular circumstances of their case.’ 
2.1. The Safety Case and Professional Responsibility 
A proposed building situation falling outside the scope of the guidance does not mean that 
the building cannot be built, or that it is likely to be inherently unsafe. In such cases 
designers must simply demonstrate the safety case [26] for their designs based on an 
explicit evaluation of the hazards – rather than a recourse to prescriptive guidance which is 
strictly applicable only to common building situations. Qualified architects are bound by the 
standard of professional conduct and practice, as defined by the Architects Registration 
Board. Similarly, structural engineers and fire engineers are bound by the professional 
codes of conduct of their respective institutions. For both architects and engineers, failure to 
demonstrate the safety case would be indicative of a lack of care in carrying out work. 
Similarly, claims of ignorance of the key issues would represent a failure to adequately 
maintain competence, and a failure to undertake work for which they are competent. The 
specific wordings associated to this care and competence are clearly stated within the 
relevant institutional codes of conduct [27]–[29]. The consequences of failing to make the 
safety case are therefore clear for each professional group.  
 
Timber, unlike steel or concrete, burns. If a fire occurs in an engineered timber building, 
how does the hazard differ from a fire occurring in a steel or a concrete building? What 
happens during the fire? What happens after the fire has consumed the fuel in a 
compartment? Does the fire go out? Does the timber continue to burn until there is no 
structure remaining? To develop the safety case, the design professional must address 
these questions. The first step is to evaluate the hazards presented by the incorporation of 
timber into the building. Once the hazards have been identified methods can be developed 
to eliminate or mitigate them. Understanding the hazard presented by this material 
therefore starts with understanding how timber burns, and the conditions under which 
timber may stop burning. 
3. Burning and Extinction of Timber 
The burning of timber is well understood. The burning behaviour is captured by an 
extensive body of literature characterising characteristics such as critical heat flux, mass 
loss rate, and heat release rate, under a wide range of conditions [30]–[33]. It is understood 
that timber is a charring material and that, in the absence of an external heat flux, a thick 
timber element will be incapable of sustaining combustion. This is the principle of auto-
extinction of timber.  
 
Timber will contribute fuel to a fire when it begins to undergo pyrolysis. This is the process 
by which timber decomposes producing flammable gases and a rigid, carbon-rich char. In 
the presence of air, this char will be consumed by an oxidation reaction. The thermal 
decomposition is a function of temperature as illustrated in Figure 1(a) (for a piece of timber 
heated isothermally). Below 100°C, mass loss is attributed to drying of the timber. Between 
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200 and 350°C pyrolysis occurs which is characterised by rapid loss of mass. Above 
350°C, char oxidation occurs.  
 
With this knowledge, it is clear that below 200°C it is not possible for the timber to 
contribute fuel to the fire, as there will be no flammable pyrolysis gases produced.  
Figure 1 (a) Thermal decomposition of timber as a function of temperature (b) The burning 
rate of timber as a function of time when exposed to a heat flux of 40 kW/m2. 
The burning behaviour of timber exposed to a constant incident heat flux is shown in Figure 
1(b). The burning of timber is a time dependent process characterised by an initial peak of 
high burning rate followed by a long decay in burning rate which may eventually lead to 
extinction of flaming combustion. This time-dependency is due to the formation of the char 
layer which reduces the rate of energy transfer to the pyrolysis zone and hence the 
pyrolysis rate. 
 
Flaming combustion will only be sustained if the pyrolysis rate is sufficient to sustain a 
flammable gas-air mixture. The rate of pyrolysis per unit area (denoted by ?̇?#$$) is driven by 
the energy received by the timber from any external heat sources (?̇?&$$), energy feedback 
from flame formed by the burning timber (?̇?'$$), radiative energy losses from the surface of 








where Δ𝐻# is the energy that must be supplied to drive the pyrolysis reaction. From this 
energy balance it follows that the energy gain (?̇?'$$ + ?̇?&$$) must be larger than the energy 
losses (?̇?(,*$$ + ?̇?(,+$$ ) for the pyrolysis reaction to occur. Small-scale experimental studies have 
shown that there is a critical mass loss rate (?̇?#,+*45$$ ) of between 3.0 and 4.0 g/s/m2 [34], [35] 
is required to sustain the combustion of timber.  
 
Using the above formulation, it is possible to define critical values of	?̇?&$$ for which burning of 
the timber will not be sustained and hence the timber will auto-extinguish. Using small-scale 
experiments, this value has been shown to be in the range of 30-45 kW/m2 [36], [37] 
however there is little confirmation that this value is applicable under conditions relevant to 
compartment fires (e.g. at comparable orientations and length-scales). 
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4. Hazards and Mitigations 
The fundamental hazard introduced by the use of engineered timber is that timber burns.  
However, the degree to which this results in other hazards is dependent on the overall fire 
safety strategy for a building and how the timber is used within the building.  
 
In the case of tall buildings, it is typical that core components of the fire strategy will be an 
extended evacuation period (such as a phased evacuation in an office building); a ‘stay put’ 
strategy (in the case of residential buildings); and internal fire-fighting (using internal risers 
to supply water to upper floors). 
 
Each of these strategies is predicated on the assumption that the stability of the structure 
will be maintained for an indefinite period of time. To achieve this, the assumption that 
underlies the guidance provided in Table B4 of ADB (and other similar codes and guidance 
used around the world) is that the prescribed periods of ‘fire resistance’ for tall buildings are 
sufficient to allow the structure to resist burn-out of the fuel load. This assumption dates 
back to the earliest work on ‘time equivalence’ by Ingberg [38]. It is clearly articulated some 
of the UK’s earliest design guidance (the Post War Building Studies’ Fire Grading of 
Buildings) that, based on a characterisation of a building’s fuel load, it was possible to 
formulate requirements grades of building that ‘should resist a complete burn-out without 
failure’ [39].  
 
When the structural timber begins to burn, the fire dynamics in the compartment are 
affected. If the timber continues to burn then, it may consume all of the timber and failure 
will occur either in terms of loss of stability or breach of compartmentation. In a building 
where stability or compartmentation is required for life safety of occupants or fire service 
personnel, this is clearly not acceptable.  
 
The hazards presented by the use of engineered timber are therefore as follows: 1) that the 
timber starts to burn; 2) that the timber continues to burn until there is no structure 
remaining; 3) that the additional energy released due to the burning timber affects the fire 
dynamics; and 4) the additional energy released due to the burning timber affects the 
spread of the fire from the compartment of origin. The safety case for a tall timber building 
must, therefore, explicitly address these hazards. 
 
The challenge that structural timber poses to the idea of burnout, while not explicitly 
articulated in Approved Document B, was noted by the authors of the Post War Building 
Studies who identified that ‘all structural parts of [buildings that are required to resist 
burnout] should be of incombustible material’. In considering the historical underpinning of 
current guidance it therefore emerges that the presence of such hazards should not be 
considered as new, surprising or unexpected. They were identified, documented, and 
regulated more than 70 years ago. 
4.1. Encapsulation 
The simplest way to mitigate the hazards presented by timber is simply to prevent it from 
pyrolyzing. As described above, this can be achieved if the surface temperature of the 
timber does not exceed 200°C. This is a strategy known as encapsulation. If the timber can 
be prevented from burning, then there is a reasonable argument to be made that burnout 
can be achieved in a manner consistent with the assumptions underpinning Table B4 of 
ADB (i.e. there is no involvement of the combustible elements of construction). Hence, the 
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minimum fire resistance periods presented in Table B4 could be applied without further 
consideration of how the combustible nature of the timber affects the overall fire safety 
strategy. 
 
If this design approach is selected, then the encapsulation details must be able to prevent 
the engineered timber becoming involved in the fire for the duration of the required fire 
resistance period. To demonstrate that the protection system achieves this objective, any 
designer must undertake whatever verification methods they consider appropriate, and 
must then assume responsibility (and hence liability) for their design decisions. We would 
suggest that – at a minimum – appropriate fire testing should be undertaken on the detailing 
that will be used in the final application. 
4.1.1. Partial Encapsulation 
We have observed on several proposed and completed CLT building projects that 
designers have based their designs on an encapsulation strategy. However, in many cases, 
we have observed that encapsulation has been designed with an explicit assumption that 
the fire protection falls away from the timber at some stage within the specified fire 
resistance period – thereby exposing the surface of the CLT and allowing its subsequent 
involvement in the fire. This, to borrow from Buchanan [40], is more accurately defined as a 
partial encapsulation strategy; it does not prevent feedback between the structure and the 
fire, and does not achieve the objective of an encapsulation strategy as described above.  
 
Those with responsibility for meeting the requirements of the regulations must recognise 
that if they assume the requirements have been met by a strategy of additive fire resistance 
alone (i.e. plasterboard protection time added to a time associated to the charring of the 
timber), they are failing to recognise that auto-extinction is a precondition for any strategy 
that includes burning of timber. For a building that incorporates phased evacuation, stay 
put, or internal fire-fighting – it cannot be assumed that a strategy of additive fire resistance 
will alone meet the requirements of the regulations. 
 
There have been several examples of structural engineers explaining fire protection 
strategies for CLT buildings that fall precisely into these terms. For example in relation to 
Dalston Lane, a Chartered Structural Engineer at Ramboll was quoted in Building as saying 
‘the plasterboard gives 49 minutes of fire protection, after that the timber chars at 0.7 mm 
per minute so we have to ensure we have enough timber remaining to carry the loads after 
120 mins’ [41].  
 
A case where there is some uncertainty about the degree to which timber encapsulation 
remained in place, even during project specific fire resistance testing, is TallWood House at 
Brock Commons. In previous correspondence in this magazine, Structural Engineers 
(PEng) at Fast + Epp when pressed to demonstrate that ‘ignition of the timber did not occur 
within the two-hour fire resistance period’ were ‘not able to share the testing data’ [42] and 
therefore apparently unable to confirm whether the charring visible in photos from their full 
scale test [43] occurred prior to, or after the end of, the specified fire resistance period. 
 
In the event that encapsulation does not remain in place and prevent pyrolysis of the 
underlying timber, then the feedback between the fire and the structure has not been 
eliminated. Those with responsibility for meeting the requirements of the regulations must 
therefore either: reformulate their safety case to avoid phased evacuation, stay put, or 
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internal fire-fighting (i.e. accept that structural failure of the building during a fire is a design 
assumption); or demonstrate that auto-extinction occurs.  
4.2. Demonstrate Auto-Extinction 
If the timber starts to pyrolise and burn, the key question that designers must answer is 
whether or not their compartment will auto-extinguish prior to loss of structural stability or 
loss of compartmentation. Once the imposed fuel load within the compartment (i.e. the 
furniture and other combustible contents) has been consumed, the timber will only stop 
burning if the pyrolysis rate of the timber drops below the critical value required to sustain 
flaming combustion.  
 
Understanding and quantifying the feedback processes between the compartment fire and 
the burning timber require close examination of the energy balance for a compartment fire: 
 
?̇?7 = ?̇?8 + ?̇?9 + ?̇?: (2) 
 
where ?̇?7 is the rate of heat release due to combustion, ?̇?8 is the rate of heat loss due to 
replacement of hot gases by cold, ?̇?9 is the rate of heat loss through the walls, ceiling and 
floor, ?̇?: is the rate of heat loss by radiation through the openings. This neglects the rate of 
heat storage in the gas volume which is assumed to be small. In the case of a combustible 
compartment lining, the heat losses through the wall will include the energy required for 
pyrolysis (?̇?#) as well as the transient conduction term (?̇?+<=>) i.e. ?̇?9 = ?̇?# + ?̇?+<=>. At the 
critical pyrolysis rate for auto-extinction, ?̇?# = ?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻# and, assuming that the imposed 
fuel load has burnt out, ?̇?7 = ?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻+,# where Δ𝐻+,# is the heat of combustion of the 
pyrolysis products. 
 
Making the substitutions, Equation 1 becomes:  
 
?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻+,# = ?̇?8 + ?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻# + ?̇?+<=> + ?̇?: (3) 
 
and rearranging gives: 
 
?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻+,# − ?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻# = ?̇?8 + ?̇?+<=> + ?̇?: (4) 
 
Recognising that ?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻+,# − ?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻# = ?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻+ where Δ𝐻+ is the heat of 
combustion of the timber, the energy balance at extinction becomes: 
 
?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻+ = ?̇?8 + ?̇?: + ?̇?+<=> (5) 
 
For extinction of the timber to occur, the overall losses from the compartment must be 
greater than the energy generated due to the combustion of the timber. This can be 
expressed as follows: 
?̇?#,+*45Δ𝐻+
?̇?8 + ?̇?: + ?̇?+<=>
< 1 (6) 
 
Identifying whether this criterion is satisfied requires either case-by-case testing of each 
compartment configuration to check whether auto-extinction occurs, or explicit evaluation of 
the parameters ?̇?#,+*45, ?̇?8, ?̇?:, and ?̇?+<=> at the time of burnout of the compartment fuel 
load.  
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The terms ?̇?#,+*45, and ?̇?+<=> will be determined by the material. However, it is noteworthy 
that the terms ?̇?8 and ?̇?: are direct functions of the geometry of the compartment openings 
and therefore the ability to meet the auto-extinction requirement can be directly manipulated 
by decisions made at the design stage of the building. There is good reason to expect that, 
with adequate experimentation and with sufficient background knowledge, it will be possible 
to design compartments that consistently auto-extinguish. In this context it is worth 
considering that the fundamental fire science that controls the problem can, itself, become a 
means of generating designs; that is, architectural expression of timber defined based on 
fundamental physical laws. Just as the structural limitations of CLT limit the maximum 
spans that can economically be achieved, the flammability properties of the material will 
naturally suggest particular configurations of material and geometry of ventilation that are 
pre-disposed towards auto-extinction. 
 
A key challenge in obtaining repeatable data to allow quantification of the terms of the 
energy equation is the delamination – sometimes referred to as ‘char fall off’ – of the timber 
lamellae during the later stages of a fire. Delamination increases the local heat release rate 
of the timber and can therefore significantly affect the energy balance; this introduces a 
stochastic variable that, to date, has been difficult to predict or quantify. This analysis also 
does not consider the effects of char oxidation or sustained smouldering combustion of the 
timber – the importance of this term with respect to the overall fire behaviour is as-yet 
relatively unknown.  
4.3. Fire Spread 
Once the likelihood of auto-extinction of a particular design configuration is established, 
other hazards can then be evaluated. Key amongst these is the potential for timber 
buildings to promote fire spread. Ensuring that building-to-building fire spread is adequately 
controlled is fundamental to the success of any form of urban construction, and is an issue 
that receives considerable attention within building regulations and statutory guidance. For 
tall buildings, vertical fire spread on the outside of a building (or floor-to-floor fire spread) is 
also a relevant consideration – particularly where an extended evacuation period, a ‘stay 
put’ strategy, or internal fire-fighting is required. Building-to-building and floor-to-floor fire 
spread are clearly, therefore, relevant considerations for tall timber. 
 
External fire spread is driven by heat transfer outside the compartment. As described in the 
previous section, auto-extinction is more effectively achieved when the energy losses from 
a compartment are maximised. It is ironic that maximising these energy losses means that, 
by definition, more energy would be available to promote vertical fire spread and building-
to-building fire spread – although the hazard presented by this may be somewhat mitigated 
by the distributed release of this energy through a larger opening. 
 
For building-to-building fire spread, as with fire resistance, the guidance is underpinned by 
some fundamental assumptions [44]. These are: 1) that the internal linings of the building 
are non-combustible; and 2) the external fire plume can be ignored when considering 
building-to-building fire spread. By contrast, design consideration of vertical fire spread on 
the outside of a building is almost entirely dominated by the behaviour of the external fire 
plume.  
 
Therefore, to address the hazards of fire spread, it is necessary to quantify the impact that 
combustible timber linings have on the (increased) radiation omitted from a compartment, 
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and on the behaviour of the (more severe) external fire plume. Here we concentrate on the 
external fire plume. 
4.3.1. Behaviour of the External Fire Plume 
In compartment fires that are ventilation controlled there is insufficient supply of oxygen to 
allow all of the fuel (i.e. products of pyrolysis) to burn within the compartment. As a 
consequence, unburnt fuel can escape from the compartment (e.g. through the window 
openings) and burn in an external fire plume. In the case of compartments with timber 
linings, there is a larger exposed area of fuel – but no additional oxygen. It is logical, 
therefore, to expect more burning to occur externally. 
 
The resulting larger extent of external burning has the potential to increase the heat flux on 
neighbouring buildings thereby increasing the likelihood of building-to-building fire spread; 
and also on the storey above the floor of fire origin – thereby increasing the hazard of 
breach of compartmentation. Higher heat fluxes can also be expected on the external 
cladding materials of the burning building itself – thereby increasing the likelihood of vertical 
fire spread. 
 
The higher external burning rate and higher heat flux from the plume outside the 
compartment have been demonstrated to increase when timber linings are present. For 
example, recent work has measured incident heat fluxes that are three times greater on the 
facade above the opening when an exposed timber soffit is used in place of concrete [45].  
 
We suggest that a key objective for designers should therefore be to identify the additional 
fuel that a CLT lined compartment may release, and the fire spread hazards that this 
presents. Only then can appropriate mitigation measures be identified and implemented. 
5. Structural Stability 
If a designer is successfully able to provide an assurance of burnout, either by 
encapsulation or by demonstrating burnout, there is a further structural challenge that must 
be overcome for tall timber buildings: ensuring that the structure remains stable and does 
not collapse after the fire has gone out. The decay phase of a fire is not typically explicitly 
considered within prescriptive design codes, and does not feature explicitly in ADB. 
However, there is good reason to pay greater attention to the decay phase in an 
engineering timber building than in an equivalent steel or concrete building. 
 
Even after a fire has burnt out (or a fire testing furnace has been turned off), the 
temperatures deep with the core of a concrete or timber element will continue to rise. As a 
consequence, with any structure, there is always a possibility that the structure could lose 
stability after, rather than during, a fully developed fire. There have been relatively few 
cases where substantial failures have occurred on cooling [46] – which perhaps explains 
why, on the whole, designers have historically been able to avoid addressing this hazard. 
 
The temperatures that are reached deep within the core of a structural element are typically 
much lower than those that are reached on its surface. As a consequence, it is likely that in 
a concrete element, the core will rarely exceed the 300-500°C required to induce significant 
structural damage to the material. However, timber is more vulnerable to ‘warm’ 
temperatures – losing between 50% and 65% of its strength by 100°C, and losing 100% of 
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its strength and stiffness by 300°C. As a consequence, timber structures are more 
vulnerable during the decay phase of the fire. 
 
Based on Eurocode 5 Part 2 calculation techniques it has been demonstrated that a glue 
laminated timber column that had ‘survived’ a 90 minute standard fire resistance test with 
45% of its original crushing capacity retained less than 13% of its capacity 2-3 hours after 
the end of heating in the furnace [47]. 
 
We therefore suggest that designers should explicitly consider the propagation of the 
thermal wave during the decay phase of the fire, rather than simply relying on char depth 
calculations during the fire as is currently typical in design. This will ensure that a structure 
retains adequate stability during the decay phase of a fully developed fire. Design tools to 
perform these calculations are already available in current Eurocodes [13]. 
6. Conclusions 
Architects or principal designers should be supported by engineering specialists who can 
adequately oversee and help to solve the significant engineering challenges presented by 
this form of construction. The first step in solving these challenges is to think freely about 
the hazards, and not to be constrained by existing paradigms of fire safety design. Creating 
a safety case for such buildings is only possible if designers directly address the relevant 
hazards using knowledge based on sound scientific evidence.  
 
For buildings that require structural stability in order to support phased evacuation, stay put, 
or fire-fighting operations, the hazards presented by the use of engineered timber are as 
follows: 
1. that the timber starts to burn;  
2. that the timber continues to burn until there is no structure remaining;  
3. that the additional energy released due to the burning timber affects the fire 
dynamics; and  
4. the additional energy released due to the burning timber affects the spread of the fire 
from the compartment of origin.  
 
Unless these hazards are addressed, tall timber buildings represent a step change that 
means many of our previous insights and understanding no longer apply; in such 
circumstances there is every reason to think that tall timber buildings fall outside the scope 
of Approved Document B. Designers must acknowledge the feedback loop between the 
structure and the fire dynamics, and either eliminate it by encapsulation or satisfy 
themselves that auto-extinction will occur. The physics that control the fire dynamics of 
auto-extinction have been outlined in the paper – and the stochastic problems of 
delamination and sustained smouldering combustion must be understood and properly 
accounted for during design. 
 
With adequate underpinning experimentation, there is good reason to expect it will be 
possible to design compartments that will consistently auto-extinguish. Once this has been 
demonstrated, designers must address the hazard of external fire spread both vertically 
(from floor-to-floor), and horizontally (from building-to-building). Finally, designers must 
address the hazards during the decay phase to ensure that structural stability will be 
maintained until the structure returns to ambient temperature. 
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The evidence we have seen suggests that the hazards outlined in this paper have, in many 
cases, not been systematically addressed in the design of engineered timber buildings. It is 
our recommendation that if professionals who have been involved in the design or 
construction of engineered timber buildings (that are reliant on structural stability to support 
phased evacuation, stay put, or fire-fighting) should revisit their designs in light of the 
understanding presented in this paper. 
 
Designers must not create a legacy of buildings where the hazards are not adequately 
addressed, with resulting negative implications for the safety of life, property protection, and 
property value. If such a legacy has been (or is being) created, then William J. LeMessurier 
provides an instructive example of how to proceed [48].  
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